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Abstract
This paper studies the optimal degree of leniency in a bank stress test, when
poorly capitalized banks engage in risk shifting and a banking supervisor can in-
tervene to prevent it. The stress test directly provides the supervisor with noisy
information about whether or not a bank is well capitalized. Furthermore, the
stress test outcome a¤ects a speculators incentives to acquire costly information
about the bank and trade in its shares. This in turn a¤ects the amount of market
information available to the supervisor when she takes her intervention decision.
We show that a supervisor optimally distorts the stress test towards leniency for
banks whose shares are relatively illiquid, and about whom the supervisor has lit-
tle private information. When the supervisor has substantial private information
about a bank whose shares are fairly liquid, it is optimal to apply a conservative
stress test.
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There has been considerable interest in recent years in the question how information
conveyed by prices in secondary nancial markets feeds back into real decisions (see Bond,
Edmans and Goldstein, 2012, for a survey). One application of that literature points to
the importance of stock price information in guiding intervention decisions of regulators,
for example, a supervisor who needs to decide whether to intervene in a troubled bank
(Bond, Goldstein and Prescott, 2010, and Bond and Goldstein, 2015). As Flannery
and Bliss (2019) argue: We believe that market discipline can, potentially, complement
and support o¢ cial oversight of risky nancial institutions, [...] by providing market
signals that supervisors can use to motivate their own actions...In parallel, a number of
papers have investigated how supervisors themselves should produce and communicate
information, for example via bank stress tests, in order to assess the need for intervention
(e.g., Colliard, 2019, and Carletti, DellAriccia and Marquez, 2020). It remains a largely
open question how the two interact.
In this paper we ask how a bank supervisor should design her monitoring technology
(the stress test) in light of the impact this will have on information reected in nancial
markets. We view the monitoring technology as having two roles: rstly, it determines
directly what the supervisor can learn, and secondly, it a¤ects the incentives for a spec-
ulator to produce and trade on costly information. We have in mind a supervisor who
can choose the passhurdle of a stress test carried out on a bank, and then, based on
the test result and any further information contained in the banks share price, decide
whether or not to intervene in the bank. The supervisor tries to learn about the value
of the banks assets, knowing that a low asset value would induce risk shifting by the
bank. The supervisor can intervene and reduce the banks risk exposure, for example by
arranging its sale to a better capitalized bank that will not engage in risk shifting. Since
a speculator can try to learn the value of the banks assets, stock prices may contain
additional information that is useful for the supervisor.
The specic question we ask is how lenient a supervisors stress test should be? That
is, unlike existing papers in the literature (for an overview, see Goldstein and Yang,
2017) we do not focus on information precision per se, but on how the supervisor should
optimally trade o¤ type I and type II errors. Under a lenient stress test, a bad bank
is more likely to pass (type II error), while good banks are more likely to be subject to
intervention under a conservative test (type I error). Similar to the literature on Bayesian
persuasion (discussed in more detail below), we assume that the supervisor designs the
monitoring technology (stress test) in a way that is publicly observable and then publishes
the outcome of the test. Hence, there is no scope for ex post opportunism, for example
in the form of the supervisor hiding or misreporting the test result.
Our main ndings are the following. We show that a speculators expected trading
prots are higher for a bank that passes its stress test than for one that fails it. This is
because a bank that fails the test is subject to intervention by the supervisor, which wipes
out equity, leaving no protable trading opportunity for the speculator. A supervisor
therefore has an incentive to let more banks pass the test, as only for these banks market
information will be produced. The optimal stress test design will therefore trade-o¤ the
increased information conveyed by stock prices under a more lenient test, against the cost
of allowing more bad banks to continue without intervention.
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We also consider the case where the supervisor may sometimes privately learn more
from the stress test than the publicly observed pass/fail signal. Interestingly, the existence
of such private information increases the speculators trading prots following a failed
test. This is because there is now a chance that the supervisor will have privately learned
that a bank failed a test only by a small margin and therefore ignore the test result and
allow the bank to continue anyway. Equity value will therefore not necessarily be wiped
out following a failed test, which allows the speculator to trade protably. Inducing
information production following either test outcome requires distorting the stress test
towards conservatism: The supervisor, being concerned with making trade protable
following a failcertication, may need to leave more trading prots to the speculator
by making the fail outcome less informative. That can be achieved by generating
erroneous failcertications more frequently, i.e., by applying a more conservative test.
This increases the informational advantage (and trading prots) of a speculator vis-a-vis
the market maker who only observes the publicly announced test result.
Our model shows that lenient tests should be applied to banks for which it is par-
ticularly di¢ cult to encourage the production of market information, i.e., banks whose
shares are less liquid, or where information production is particularly costly for specu-
lators. Moreover, when a supervisor can rely more heavily on additional information,
beyond the publicly observable results of stress test, we would expect her to benet from
using a more conservative test design.
It would be an exaggeration to argue that supervisors in practice determine the le-
niency of their stress test design, solely on the basis of the trade-o¤s described in our
model. Evidently, supervisors will also be guided by other concerns, and below we dis-
cuss some of the papers that have studied such concerns. Nevertheless, we believe it is
important to be aware of the trade-o¤s we identify. One clear implication of our analysis
is that a one-size-ts-allapproach has costs, as for some banks it will likely result in a
drop in the information quality on which intervention decisions are based. For example,
a supervisor who adopts a lenient test design should be aware that this will have adverse
consequences for the quality of stock price information for banks who failed the test. In a
similar vein, an increase in conservatism of the test design, can actually reduce the uncon-
ditional probability of an intervention by the supervisor. This is, because conservatism
may increase the amount of speculative information produced following a fail result,
and this additional information can prevent unnecessary interventions in banks that are
actually sound (but for which the test erroneously generated a failverdict).
In addition we study the impact of the severity of the risk shifting problem on the
usefulness of markets in producing information. As the risk shifting problem gets more
severe, the stock market becomes less useful in providing information. This happens
because the value of an equity claim, conditional on no intervention, becomes less sensitive
to the underlying state of the world, undermining a speculators incentives to produce
information about it. On the one hand, in the low state of the world, the value of assets
in place is low, reducing the value of equity. On the other hand, the bank engages in risk
shifting in the low state of the world, and the accompanying expropriation of creditors
increases equity value. We thus identify a new wedge between the private and social
incentives to produce information. Private incentives are driven by the variability in
value of the traded claim, which is equity. Social incentives, on the other hand, stem
from the value that accrues to debt and equityholders together. A worsening risk shifting
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problem reduces private incentives of a share trader to produce information, but increases
the social value of this information. This problem di¤ers from the one identied in Bond,
Goldstein and Prescott (2010) who show that the mapping from the states of the world to
the price may not be invertible. The fact that the price of an equity claim sends a mixed
message when risk shifting is a problem has been recognized intuitively by advocates of
subordinated debt as generating market discipline (see Flannery and Bliss, 2019, for a
review of the arguments). However, this point has not been taken up in the feedback
literature, probably because most of the papers work in relatively abstract settings in
which the link between regulatory intervention and the value of the traded claim is xed
by assumption.
We extend our analysis to allow for trade in debt claims and show that it may be the
case that a speculator trades in shares when the stress test was passed, but trades in debt
claims when a bank failed the test. Whether in practice the secondary market in debt
claims provides an adequate venue for information aggregation is questionable. Debt
markets are typically over the counter, making it harder for supervisors to learn from
trades. Debt markets are also signicantly less liquid than equity markets, and taking
short positions in debt markets is more costly, reducing an informed traders ability to
prot. Finally, it is widely believed that in spite of recent regulatory changes, markets
expect signicant fractions of debt claims to be bailed out in case of a bank failure,
limiting their exposure to the risk of failure (see Cutura, 2018, or Flannery and Bliss,
2019). The limited role that secondary debt markets are likely to play in practice justies
our papers focus on stock markets.
There are a number of papers that have studied whether stress test results should be
disclosed, e.g., Orlov, Zryumov and Skrzypacz, 2018, Bouvard, Chaigneau and de Motta,
2015, Goldstein and Leitner, 2015, Leitner and Williams, 2018, and Williams, 2017 (see
also Goldstein and Sapra, 2014, for a review). Disclosure matters, as it may a¤ect mar-
ket discipline, the functioning of the interbank market, nancial stability, bank lending
behaviour and risk sharing. In this paper, we take for granted that stress test results are
published, which corresponds to the practice that supervisors have converged to. The
supervisors choice of leniency, however, indirectly a¤ects the quality of information that
is publicly available, including the limiting case, where all banks always pass the test (or
always fail it), which degenerates the stress test to have zero information. Given that our
model allows for additional information to be available to the supervisor, our specica-
tion includes the case where a supervisor is privately informed and chooses not to provide
information to the public by using a degenerate test. We show that in the limiting case,
where the supervisors private information is so good that she never learns anything from
the stress test, it may indeed be optimal to design a degenerate test, and rely entirely
on private information. We also study an extension where the supervisor learns from
both the test and a noisy private signal, but can commit not to disclose the test result.
We show that it can be optimal to commit to disclosure, particularly when banks are
ex ante in relatively bad shape. In that case trading prots under a no-disclosure policy
may be too low to warrant information production (since an intervention is ex ante quite
likely). By committing to disclose, a supervisor can ensure that at least information
production occurs for those banks that pass the test. The dependence of disclosure on
the general healthof the banking sector is reminiscent of Bouvard et al. (2015) and
Wiliams (2017), although the underlying mechanisms are very di¤erent.
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The papers closest to ours are Bond and Goldstein (2015) and Siemroth (2019) who
study the interaction of a regulators information (including a decision to disclose such
information) with information revealed by share prices, when that information is in turn
used by the regulator. They show that more public information may crowd out private
information as it reduces the informational advantage of speculators. This e¤ect is bal-
anced by a crowding-in e¤ect, as public information reduces the riskiness of speculators
trades, inducing them to take larger positions. Also related is Goldstein and Yang (2017)
who study the interaction between public disclosure and market based information in a
context where the decision maker learns from both, the public signal and market prices
(unlike in Bond and Goldstein (2015) where the regulator has information regardless of
whether or not it is made public). Goldstein and Yang (2017) focus on two dimensions of
uncertainty and explore how disclosure a¤ects the weight that traders put on one of the
two private signals they possess. They show that when information is disclosed about
the dimension of uncertainty that is relevant for the real decision, then this will reduce
the weight that traders put on that dimension of their private signals. By crowding out
information aggregation on the usefuldimension, more public disclosure may reduce
the overall amount of information relevant for the real decision.
Our focus is di¤erent in that we study the role of tilting the supervisors information
production technology towards either type I or II errors in a context where a speculator
faces an information production cost. Unlike in Bond and Goldstein (2015) or Goldstein
and Yang (2017), the information production decision depends sensitively on the realiza-
tion of the public signal, with less information being produced following a negative public
signal than following a positive one.
The e¤ect that trading prots di¤er, depending on whether public information is
positive or negative, is due to the fact that the supervisors decision depends on public
information in such a way as to reduce the residual uncertainty of the traded claim follow-
ing negative public information. This is related to Dow, Goldstein and Guembel (2017)
who show that speculatorsinformation production may break down when rmsinvest-
ment prospects are unfavorable, because such rms are unlikely to invest, undermining
the incentive for speculators to produce information about those prospects.
When thinking about monitoring and reporting, we take an angle akin to that in the
literature on Bayesian persuasion (see Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011 and Szydlowski,
2020, among others). That is, we think of a supervisor as having to design an information
technology up front, which determines how an underlying state is mapped into a publicly
observable signal. In the Bayesian persuasion literature, a receiver acts once the signal is
observed. Our paper di¤ers in that the receiver (the speculator) has a role of producing
additional information that is subsequently disseminated via a price mechanism. The
supervisor thus chooses the information structure with a view to encouraging information
production by the speculator, taking into account that the information structure a¤ects
both direct and indirect learning.
Our paper is also related to the literature on banking regulation which regards the
banks moral hazard problem as a central friction that regulation can address, for exam-
ple, Bhattacharya (1982), Calzolari and Loranth (2011), Fecht, Inderst and Pfeil (2017),
Gorton and Huang (2004), Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000), Morrison and White
(2005) or Rochet (1992). A number of papers have argued that in such a context a super-
visor plays a role by intervening in bad banks at risk of failure by rendering their risky
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payo¤s safe (see Calzolari, Colliard, and Loranth, 2018). In Carletti, DellAriccia and
Marquez (2020) banks take too much risk in a laissez-faire equilibrium and supervision
is designed to reduce their risk exposure. The supervisor monitors and learns about the
amount of a banks capital (and its portfolio) and can then intervene so as to reduce risk
exposure. When an intervention occurs, shareholders are expropriated. We share with
that literature the focus on a banks risk shifting incentives and the supervisors role in
curbing them. Our central point on the design of the supervisors information and its
interaction with market-based information is new to this literature.
Shapiro and Zeng (2018) look into the leniency of bank stress tests. As in our paper,
stress tests serve to generate information for the supervisor. The leniency of the test is
the supervisors hidden choice and supervisors build a reputation over time. Leniency in
their paper trades o¤ information content (higher default probability) against a reduction
in loans to the real sector. There may be multiple equilibria due to reputational concerns.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains the model set-
up. In Section 3 we solve for the benchmark without a speculator. We then introduce
a speculator and study a special parametric case in Section 4 while Section 5 solves for
the general case. In Section 6 we study model extensions and Section 7 concludes. Most
proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The model
To guide the detailed model description, we begin with a brief overview. There are four
dates t = 0; :::; 3. There is a bank, a supervisor, a speculator, a market maker and
a liquidity trader. At date 0, the supervisor chooses a monitoring technology, i.e., a
stress test that generates a public signal at date 1 about the value of the banks assets.
The speculator can observe the public signal and then decide whether to acquire costly
(private) information and trade on it at date 2. The supervisor observes the banks share
price and possibly an additional signal before having to decide whether to intervene or
allow the bank to continue. If the supervisor does not intervene, the bank can choose
whether or not to engage in a risk shifting activity. At date 3, uncertainty is realized and
all payo¤s made.
There is a bank with assets in place whose value A! depends on an underlying state of
the world ! 2 fl; hg. Each state is ex ante equally likely and chosen by nature at t = 0.
For simplicity we assume Al = 0 and Ah > 0. The bank also has on-going operations that
generate risky cash ows in the future. Details on this follow below. The bank is nanced
with an amount of debt D > Ah, which we take as given, and is run by a manager whom
we call the banker and who acts in the interest of the banks shareholders. The banker
is privately informed about !, which is otherwise unobserved.1
1We exclude here the possibility of truthtelling contracts that might extract the bankers informa-
tion. An older literature has considered how regulation, such as the pricing of deposit insurance, can
induce truthtelling by the banker when the latter is also subject to an agency problem (e.g., Chan,
Greenbaum and Thakor, 1992, Giammarino, Lewis and Sappington, 1993 or Freixas and Rochet, 1995).
The subsequent literatures continued focus on the monitoring role of supervisors is arguably an implicit
acknowldgement of the di¢ culty of implementing such schemes in practice. Moreover, having market
information at her disposal, the supervisor could presumably reduce the informational rent left to the
banker from a truthtelling mechanism. Hence, allowing for trutelling contracts does not necessarily
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The supervisor has a monitoring technology which we call a stress test and that
generates a noisy public signal m 2 ffail; passg at date 1 about the state !. At date 0
the supervisor can choose the degree of conservatism of the stress test, captured by the
choice variable s 2 [0; 1]. This choice a¤ects the conditional distribution of the public
signal as follows,
Pr (m = passj! = h) = 1  (s)2 ; (1)
Pr (m = passj! = l) = (1  s)2 : (2)
The specic assumptions embedded in (1) and (2), are convenient because they generate
Bayesian updates that are linear in the choice variable s:








Intuitively, an increase in s makes the positive signal m = pass more informative about
the state ! = h. At the same time, it reduces the information content of the negative
signal fail. An increase in s can therefore be thought of as increasing conservatism: the
negative signal m = fail is generated more frequently, but is also less informative, while
the positive signal m = pass is awarded rarely, but when it is, it is highly informative.
At the corner s = 0, observing a pass signal is entirely uninformative about which is the
true state, while a fail signal perfectly reveals that the state of the world is ! = l. At
the opposite corner s = 1, the pass signal perfectly reveals that the true state is ! = h ,






noisy and symmetric, i.e., Pr (! = hjm = pass) = Pr (! = ljm = fail) = 3
4
.
In addition to the public signal, we allow for the case where the supervisor may glean
additional information during the monitoring process. We assume that such information is
soft and cannot be revealed publicly, possibly because of its technical complexity. In order
to model such additional information, suppose that the monitoring process generates an
internal signal s 2 [0; 1] drawn from the following distribution:
f (sj! = h) = 2s;
f (sj! = l) = 2 (1  s) : (5)
The internal signal could be thought of as information generated, for example, by applying
a variety of scenarios or di¤erent valuation models to value a banks assets. The internal
signal s then generates the public signal m as follows
m (s) =

fail if s < s
pass if s  s : (6)
Notice that (5) and (6) yield exactly the Bayesian updates given in (3) and (4). This
captures the idea that by choosing s; the supervisor can apply tougher or softer scenarios
(more or less generous valuation models) when monitoring the bank, and that this will
undermine the role of market information. However, taking these considerations fully on board would
distract us from the papers main message.
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have an impact on the publicly observable assessment, m. In what follows we will refer
to s interchangeably as the signal cut-o¤ and the degree of leniency of the stress test.
Suppose that the supervisor directly observes the internal signal with probability




s; with probability 
?; with probability 1   (7)
 captures the extent to which the supervisor does herself understand and include in her
own decision making the information s. It has been argued that in a supervisory union,
the local (national) supervisor has better information than the centralized (international)
supervisor, and  can be thought of as capturing such informational di¤erences (e.g.,
Colliard (2019) or Carletti, DellAriccia and Marquez (2020)). That is, it could be that a
local supervisor observes s but the central supervisor only observes m. Alternatively, one
could think of s as being complex, technical information, which the supervisor may be
unable to use in its decision process, possibly because it is distributed across technicians
(e.g., several derivatives pricing experts) whose information is not aggregated other than
in the public signal m and who have no further inuence on the supervisors decision.
Once m is publicly communicated, the speculator can decide whether to acquire a
private signal about !.2 Assume that he can neither directly observe s, nor whether the
supervisor has observed s. If the speculator pays a cost c he receives a signal z, which
fully reveals ! with a probability  2 (0; 1] and is completely uninformative otherwise:
z =

! with probability 
? with probability (1  ) : (8)
The speculator can then trade in the banks shares at date 2. The market mechanism
is based on Kyle (1985): the speculator can submit a market order to a risk neutral
market maker. In addition to the speculator, there is a liquidity trader who buys or sells
with equal probability a quantity n. The liquidity trader can be thought of as trading
for non-information related reasons, such as taxes, consumption needs, insurance and
hedging etc. The market maker observes each order separately but cannot tell which
originates from the liquidity trader and which from the informed speculator. The market
maker then sets a price P so as to break even in expectation.
Still at date 2, but after having observed m, ssup; and P , the supervisor can choose
whether or not to intervene in the bank. We denote the corresponding action by a 2 f0; 1g
where a = 1 means the supervisor allows the bank to continue without intervention. If
the bank is allowed to continue, its operations generate cash ows at date 3, which can
be high, R, medium, r, or low, 0 with R > r > 0. The banker can choose whether to
act prudently or recklessly. If the banker is prudent, the probabilities of the respective
outcomes are Pr (R) = p
2
, Pr (r) = 1   p and Pr (0) = p
2
. If the banker is reckless,
the probabilities change to Pr (R) = p+"
2
, Pr (r) = 1   (p+ ") and Pr (0) = p+"
2
, where
" 2 (0; 1  p)
2Our assumption that a speculator can learn something from the stress test results is in line with
empirical evidence showing that stock prices react to stress test outcomes (Petrella and Resti, 2013, and
Georgescu et al., 2017).
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Probability of outcomes










We make several parametric assumptions, which are aimed at capturing the following:
the banker who acts on behalf of shareholders behaves prudently as long as the banks
balance sheet is in good health (assets are worth Ah), but engages in risk shifting when
its balance sheet deteriorates (assets are worth Al = 0).
First, assume that the bank can repay its debt, if it generates cash ow R, regardless
of the value of assets in place, i.e.,
R > D: (9)
Second, assume that when cash ows are medium (r), the bank cannot repay its debt
when assets have a low value Al = 0, i.e.,
D > r: (10)
The two inequalities (9) and (10) imply that a poorly capitalized bank (i.e., in state
! = l) behaves recklessly. To see this, compare the expected equity value from being
prudent p
2
(R D) to that from being reckless p+"
2
(R D), the latter obviously being
higher.
Moreover, we make the following parametric assumption, which ensures that a well
capitalized bank chooses to behave prudently:
2r + Ah  R  D: (11)
Note that (11) implies
p
2
(R + Ah  D)+(1  p) (r + Ah  D) 
p+ "
2
(R + Ah  D)+(1  (p+ ")) (r + Ah  D) ;
which means equity value is higher from being prudent (left-hand side of the inequality)
than from being reckless. Inequality (11) also implies r+Ah  D  R  r > 0, so that a
well capitalized bank can repay its debt when the medium cash ow r is realized.
Intervention (a = 0) is intended to limit the risk taking activities of the bank. Here, we
assume that intervention takes the form of arranging an acquisition of the banks ongoing
activities by a better capitalized bank who will not engage in risk shifting. Alternatively,
one could assume that the bank is liquidated following an intervention. We assume that
the value of the banks ongoing activities is reduced by the intervention so that the




R + (1  p) r

;
where  < 1. The loss in value can be thought of as stemming from the new owners infe-
rior ability to manage the failed banks assets, or from a re-sale discount when liquidat-
ing the banks operations (or any other costs associated with intervention). We assume,
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without loss of generality, that the value of assets in place, A! is not a¤ected by the inter-




R + (1  p) r

+A!.





R + (1  p) r

+ Ah: (12)
This implies that an intervention by the supervisor fully wipes out the banks sharehold-
ers.
It follows from (11) and (12), that
2r > R; (13)
which implies that expected cash ows are higher when the bank is prudent. Hence, the
model captures a situation, where a bank that experiences an adverse shock to its balance
sheet (Al = 0) becomes undercapitalized (excessively levered), generating incentives to
gamble. Since the supervisors intervention can prevent excessive risk taking by the bank,
it will be crucial for her to identify if the banks assets have a high or low value.
Note that our model is rich enough to capture a forced recapitalization as an alter-
native way to think about a supervisors intervention. A forced recapitalization would
wipe out (or severly dilute) existing shareholders and require a potentially costly subsidy
by the supervisor, providing her with an incentive to intervene only in state ! = l. We
can also include a cost of an ex-post bank failure (such as through negative spillovers on
other banks) in the supervisors objective function without this changing our results. In
Appendix B, we show how this can be done.
We can dene by V a! the banks overall expected value (debt plus equity), conditional
on the state ! and the supervisors action a. If the bank is allowed to continue, we know









R + (1  p  ") r (15)
and
V 0h = 
p
2
R + (1  p) r

+ Ah; (16)
V 0l = 
p
2
R + (1  p) r

: (17)
Denote by Vh  V 1h  V 0h , the gain from allowing a well capitalized bank to continue
instead of intervening. By our assumption  < 1 this is positive, i.e., Vh > 0. Similarly,
denote by Vl  V 0l   V 1l the gain from intervening in a poorly capitalized bank instead
of allowing it to continue. Since we are interested in the case where intervention is








R + (1  p) r : (18)
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There is a lower bound on , because an intervention is costly. This cost needs to
be balanced against the gain from curbing excessive risk taking by the bank, which is
captured by "
2
(2r  R). As " increases, the risk shifting problem gets more severe, and
hence the value from intervening increases, lowering the bound on  that still leaves an
intervention optimal.
3 Benchmark without a speculator
As a rst step in the analysis it is useful to consider what the optimal degree of leniency
s would be in the absence of a potentially informed speculator. This benchmark would
apply to banks that are not listed and therefore the price as an information channel is
absent. Suppose therefore that the supervisor chooses s so as to maximize the banks
ex ante expected value, knowing that the supervisors information set will consist of m;
and, potentially, s.
If the supervisor ends up observing s directly, the signal m contains no additional
information. In this case, it is optimal for the supervisor to allow the bank to continue if
and only if
Pr (! = hjs)V 1h + [1  Pr (! = hjs)]V 1l
 Pr (! = hjs)V 0h + [1  Pr (! = hjs)]V 0l :
Calculating Pr (! = hjs) by Bayesian updating, using (5) yields
Pr (! = hjs) = s;
and therefore the supervisors optimal policy is to allow the bank to continue if and only
if
s  bs  Vl
Vh +Vl
: (19)
Using (14) to (17) the cut-o¤ bs can be re-written as
bs = 1  (1  ) p2R + (1  p) r"
2
(2r  R) : (20)
Using assumption (18), it follows that bs 2 (0; 1). We observe directly that ŝ increases in
both  and ". Intuitively, the supervisor is more prone to intervening when the banks
liquidation value is higher ( is higher) and when the risk-shifting problem is more severe
(a higher "), implying that more value gets destroyed by allowing a bad bank to continue.
This renders a more conservative intervention policy optimal, i.e., it raises the barthat
will induce the supervisor to allow the bank to continue.
When the supervisor does not observe s, i.e., when ssup = ?; she needs to rely on m
for her intervention decision. We rst determine the optimal intervention decision, given
the observed signalm, and then study the ex ante optimal choice of s. In principle, three
intervention policies are possible. There are two uncontingent policies (always intervene
or never intervene) and one contingent policy (intervene if and only if m = fail). If the
degree of leniency is such that an unconditional policy would be ex post optimal, then
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the signal m would be altogether useless. It is therefore obvious that in the benchmark,
an optimal cut-o¤ will induce a conditional intervention policy.
It is useful to characterize the regions of the cut-o¤ s such that the intervention
policy of the supervisor will actually be contingent on the signal m. In order to highlight
this region, we state the following straightforward result.3
Lemma 1 In the absence of market information, the supervisors intervention policy is
contingent on m, if and only if
2bs  1  s  2bs: (21)
For s < 2bs   1, the supervisor always intervenes and for s > 2bs the supervisor never
intervenes, regardless of the realization of m.
Proof. Using the Bayesian updates calculated in (3) and (4) it is clear that intervention
is optimal following a fail signal if




On the other hand it is optimal not to intervene following a pass signal if




Rearranging the two inequalities yields (21).
In other words, the supervisors intervention policy will be signal-contingent if the cut-
o¤ s satises (21). Note that for bs < 1
2
this e¤ectively reduces to the interval s 2 [0; 2bs)
and for bs  1
2
to s 2 [2bs  1; 1] : We can thus denote the lower and upper bounds on
s such that intervention is contingent on the test result, by s  max f0; 2bs  1g and
s  min f2bs; 1g, respectively. Intuitively, bs < 1
2
corresponds to the case where, in the
absence of any signal m, it is optimal not to intervene. Hence, no intervention remains
optimal after a pass signal, regardless of the choice of s, while a fail signal will induce
intervention as long as s < 2bs. When s  2bs the fail signal is so uninformative that
the supervisor will ignore it and allow the bank to continue. Conversely, when bs > 1
2
, it is
optimal to intervene when nothing further is known about the bank, so that intervention
always remains optimal after a fail signal. A pass signal prevents the supervisor from
intervening when it is su¢ ciently informative (s  2bs  1) but not otherwise.
The following Lemma characterizes the optimal cut-o¤ s.
Lemma 2 When there is no speculator, the optimal stress test features s = bs.
Proof. Assume there is no stock market. If the supervisor observes ssup = s, the location
of s is irrelevant. If the supervisor does not observe s, the public signal m is used to
take a decision. Clearly an s that is optimal will induce a signal contingent intervention
decision (otherwise m is completely useless) so that a = 1 following m = pass and a = 0
otherwise.
3Suppose in case of indi¤erence, the supervisor follows the public signal. This assumption is immate-
rial.
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Using the Bayesian updates we can calculate expected bank value as a function of the
cut-o¤ s (the index ? indicates that the speculator does not produce any information)
V? (s














(1  s)2 V 1l + s (2  s)V 0l

:
Since s is immaterial when ssup = s, the supervisor chooses s to maximize (22). Taking
the rst-order condition and solving with respect to s yields s = bs.
The result of Lemma 2 is very intuitive. Without an informed speculator, the only
source of information for the supervisor is the signal generated by the monitoring tech-
nology. The optimal cut-o¤ therefore maximizes the information content of that signal.
The latter is most informative when knowing the s which generated the signal would lead
to the same decision as observing the signal m only. This is the case when s = bs.
Note that the optimal stress test generates di¤erent probabilities of type I and type
II errors, corresponding to the economic cost of each of the errors. For example, when
Vh > Vl; it is more costly to intervene in a high value bank (type I error), then to
allow a low value bank to continue (type II error) and from (19), bs < 1
2
. The probability
of making a type I error is Pr (m = failj! = h) = (s)2, while the probability of a type
II error is Pr (m = passj! = l) = (1  s)2. Clearly, if s = bs < 1
2
, then, at the optimal
policy, the probability of a type I error is lower than that of a type II error. The stress
test therefore exhibits some bias towards leniency in that it generates more pass signals
than fail ones.
We now want to focus on the case, where the presence of a stock market as a poten-
tial information channel may generate a bias in the supervisors stress test design. We
therefore dene a stress test as being conservative (lenient), if it is more conservative
(lenient) than the benchmark we just derived, i.e., conservatism corresponds to s > bs
and leniency to s < bs.
4 Supervisor has no private signal ( = 0)
We now analyze the case when there is a speculator. We start with the extreme case
where the supervisor never has any private information. Doing so allows us to highlight
the main economic mechanism that leads the supervisor to distort the optimal stress test
towards leniency.4 In Section 5 we study the general case   0.
In the rst step we need to examine how the speculators decision to acquire costly
information depends on the supervisors stress test design. This requires a characteriza-
tion of the trading subgame and associated trading prots for the speculator. Since the
speculator trades the banks shares, we need to determine the banks equity valuation,
depending on the various combinations of the state ! and the supervisors action a.
We denote by Ea! the banks equity value that corresponds to the state of the world !
and the supervisors decision a. From assumption (12) it is obvious that, if the supervisor
4The case analyzed here also corresponds to a situation in which the supervisor commits to following
the stress test outcome, no matter what her private information. Such a commitment can be valuable if






This captures the idea that a regulatory intervention will generate a bail-in and drastically
reduce the value of equity, in our case, all the way down to zero.5 If the supervisor allows









The value of equity under continuation depends on the state ! in two ways. First, the
value of assets in place A! is higher in state ! = h, lifting the value of equity. Second,
the banker decides to be prudent in state ! = h but is reckless in state ! = l. Gambling
in the low state actually increases the value of equity as it expropriates creditors. We










It is easy to verify that our parametric assumptions (namely 1  p  " > 0 and (11))
implyE1 > 0. The following proposition presents the equilibrium and associated prots
of the trading sub-game.
Proposition 1 Suppose the speculator pays the information acquisition cost c. If he
receives an uninformative signal z = ? he does not trade. He buys n units after observing
z = h, and sells n units after observing z = l.






E1 (1  s2) if s  2bs  1
0 otherwise
: (25)










The trading strategy is intuitive: the speculator buys on positive information, sells
on negative information and does not trade when he is uninformed.
First, note that order ow is either fully revealing (when (n; n) or ( n; n)) or entirely
uninformative (when ( n; n)). When order ow is fully revealing, the supervisor ignores
the public signal m and follows the information revealed through the trading process.
Because order ow fully reveals ! the speculator cannot make a trading prot when
order ow is either (n; n) or ( n; n). When order ow is uninformative, the supervisor
5Note that if one were to assume that the supervisors intervention generates a liquidation value which
is independent of !; perhaps because the government nationalizes the bank at terms that are independent
of !, then we would directly get E0h = E
0
l > 0. This would give us exactly the same results, even though
equity would only be partially wiped out following an intervention.
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Figure 1: This Figure shows the speculators expected trading prots, conditional on
observing m = pass (downward sloping line) or m = fail (dashed line) as a function
of the cuto¤ s. Parameter values are Ah = 2:5, r = 7:5, R = 9, D = 8:15, p = 0:57,
 = 0:13;  = 0:9585.
makes her intervention decision contingent on m only. Expected trading prots therefore
di¤er, depending on whether the public signal m conveys good or bad information, i.e.,
whether the banks stress test generated a pass or a fail verdict.
Consider rst trading prots following a pass signal. When s  2bs   1 (and the
supervisor learns nothing from the stock price), the supervisor will not intervene. The
range of the banks equity values is therefore E1 to which the speculators prots are
proportional.
When s < 2bs   1, the supervisor who learns m = pass would ignore that infor-





R + (1  p) r

+ A! and leave nothing to the equityholder. Speculators thus cannot
make any trading prot. The supervisors intervention eliminates all equity risk and
thereby the value of the speculators private information.
Note also that for s above 2bs   1, expected trading prots are decreasing in s.
This is because the information content of a pass signal is higher when s increases:
the more conservative the stress test, the less likely is it that a pass signal will emerge.
But if it does emerge, the signal m = pass is a stronger indication that the true state
is ! = h. This, however, reduces the speculators informational advantage vis-a-vis the
market maker and therefore his expected trading prots.
Trading prots following the fail signal display some important di¤erences. If the
supervisor actually follows the fail signal and intervenes (whenever s  2bs), then ex-
pected trading prots are zero, i.e., fail (s  2bs) = 0. Trading prots can only be
positive when the fail signal has become so uninformative that the supervisor chooses
to ignore it and allow the bank to continue regardless (when s > 2bs). In that region,
trading prots are increasing in s, because the fail signal gets less and less informative
when the stress test becomes increasingly conservative.
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We can now determine the optimal stress test design. From the above, three broad
options emerge. In the rst two, the monitoring technology is chosen, such that it is
uncontingent in the absence of information contained in the stock price (either always
intervene, or never intervene). In the benchmark, such a policy was clearly inferior to
a monitoring technology that induces a signal contingent intervention decision. This,
however, cannot be taken for granted in the presence of a potentially informative stock
price, since one needs to understand the e¤ect of an uncontingent policy on information
production by speculators. As the Proposition below shows, the direct positive e¤ect of
a contingent monitoring policy dominates, so that we can rule out uncontingent policies
and focus on the interval s 2 [s; s].
Moreover, expected bank value depends on the information contained in stock prices.
Denote by I 2 f?; fpassg ; ffailg ; fpass; failgg the public signals following which the
speculator acquires information. If the speculator produces and trades on information
following the pass signal and s 2 [s; s], the expected value of the bank can be written
as follows6:
Vfpassg (s




































It can easily be veried that smax 2 (2bs  1; bs). Moreover, we dene s?pass as the smaller





= V? (bs) ;
where V? (bs) is given by (22)8. s?pass is thus the value of s that makes the supervisor
indi¤erent between having information provided by the stock market (after the pass
signal), or using the benchmark monitoring technology without any information from
the stock market. s?pass can be interpreted as the maximum distortion the supervisor is
willing to accept so as to induce speculator information production following the pass











As  approaches 1, s?pass can be below s which corresponds to the case when Vfpassg (s) >
V? (bs) ; i.e., the supervisor prefers to distort s to the maximum (its lower bound s) rather
than forgo information production by the speculator.
6We show in the proof of Proposition 3 that Vfpassg (s < bs) > Vfpassg (s  bs).
7Clearly, Vpass (bs) > V? (bs) and therefore there are two points s where Vpass (s) = V? (bs). Since the
supervisor is only willing to distort the signal in order to induce information production by the speculator
whose trading prots pass (s) are decreasing in s, we are only interested in the smaller solution.
8When  = 0, the expected bank value under I = ? is the same as V? (bsjssup = ?).
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Figure 2: This Figure plots the optimal stress test s as a function of the ratio of information
production cost over liquidity trader volume.




provides the supervisors optimal choice of stress test.
Proposition 2 (i) If c
n
 pass (smax), then s = smax < bs.






, then s  s < bs and s is given by









, then s = bs.
Proof see Appendix.
First, note that the optimal stress test never induces information acquisition by the
speculator following the fail signal. Although the supervisor could, for some values
of c
n
, induce the production of speculative information by adopting a very conservative
(s > 2bs) or a very lenient (s < 2bs  1) policy, this has a downside: it generates a direct
loss of information from rendering the stress test very uninformative - as a matter of fact,
so uninformative that the supervisor would ignore the stress test result entirely, unless
the stock price reveals the banks true asset value.
Second, the supervisor optimally distorts the monitoring policy towards leniency, i.e.,
s < bs, unless information acquisition is too costly. The benet of leniency can be
understood from (27). A more lenient policy increases the ex ante likelihood that a
pass signal will be generated. Since the speculator only produces information following
the pass signal, a more lenient policy increases the likelihood that the speculator will
produce information. Of course, this gain has to be traded o¤ against the loss of direct
information conveyed to the supervisor by the public signal. This loss manifests itself
in too little intervention, namely when ! = l but m = pass, and order ow ends up
being uninformative. The optimal cut-o¤ is thus determined as an internal solution.
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This e¤ect drives leniency in region (i), i.e., when c
n
 pass (smax). When cn increases
above pass (smax) the supervisor may increase leniency even more, because it increases
the trading prots the speculator can make. That is, a further distortion towards leniency
occurs, because it allows the supervisor to keep the speculator in the market. However,
at some point the distortion becomes so large that the supervisor prefers not to distort
the stress test any further (when s = s?pass), or where any further distortion would render
the pass signal useless (s < s). At that point (region (iii)), there is no longer any reason
to distort the stress test and the benchmark policy becomes optimal.
We thus expect leniency to be prevalent when n is large, i.e., when the banks shares
are fairly liquid, and when c is not too large. Moreover, if one measures the degree of
leniency through smax, then leniency increases (smax drops) when  increases. That is,
the more likely it is that the speculators information production will generate useful
information, the more it pays the supervisor to distort the stress test towards leniency.
5 The general case (  0)
We now analyze the general case where there is a speculator and the supervisor may have
private information with a probability  > 0. We begin by characterizing the speculators
trading prots.
Lemma 3 The speculators trading strategy is described in Proposition 1. Expected trad-



















































fE1 (2  s) (s + ŝ) + 2ŝE1l g if bs  s  2bs
0 if s < bs : (31)
Proof see Appendix.
Note that (per unit) trading prots fail are increasing in s and continuous, except
in the point s = 2bs where fail jumps upwards, just like in the case previously analyzed.
The speculator, however, can now make positive prots fail > 0 when bs  s  2bs. This
happens for the following reasons. When the stress test is conservative (s > bs) ; a failed
stress test is no longer a perfect predictor of a supervisory intervention: when the bank
marginally fails a conservatively designed test and the supervisor knows that the failure
was indeed only marginal, i.e., when ssup = s 2 (bs; s), then the supervisor optimally
refrains from intervening. When that happens, the speculator can trade protably. The
higher the probability  of such information, the higher the probability that the supervisor
ignores a failed stress test, which increases the speculators prot from trading in the
banks shares. As we will show below, this e¤ect can induce the supervisor to adopt a
18
Figure 3: This Figure shows trading prots following a signal m = pass (downward sloping
line) andm = fail (dashed line). Parameter values are the same as in Figure 1, except  = 0:6
instead of  = 0.
conservative stress test. By choosing a cut-o¤ s above bs (and below 2bs) the speculator
can now be induced to produce costly information following a fail test, which was not the
case when  = 0. It turns out that this will be important for the supervisor as it allows
her, under some parameter values, to induce information production by the speculator
following both, a passed or failed stress test.9
Trading prots pass following a positive signal pass are decreasing in s 2 [s; s],
which captures the, by now familiar, e¤ect that a higher s reduces the speculators
informational advantage when the public has learnt m = pass. For s between s and bs,
an additional and opposing e¤ect emerges. When ssup = s 2 [s; ŝ); the supervisor learns
that a bank only passed the (lenient) stress test marginally and optimally intervenes -
an action that reduces trading prots. An increase in  increases the likelihood that
the supervisor privately observes a counter-indication to the public signal m = pass and
pass is therefore decreasing in  when s  s < bs. A jump occurs in pass in the point
s = 2bs   1. For s  2bs   1, the supervisor allows continuation after m = pass, unless
ssup 2 [s; bs). For s < 2bs  1 she always intervenes after m = pass unless ssup 2 [bs; 1].
We can now state the main result on the optimal stress test design.
Proposition 3 The supervisors optimal stress test s is set as follows.
(a) There is a threshold Ccon such that for cn 2 (0; Ccon], the supervisor employs a
conservative test design s > bs and the speculator produces information following both
pass and fail tests. If  > 0 then Ccon > 0 (and for  = 0, Ccon = 0).
(b1) If c
n
2 (Ccon; C?], and bs < 12 , then the optimal test design is lenient s < bs , and
the speculator only produces information following a pass test.
9When s > 2bs, an increase in  reduces trading prots following a fail signal, because the supervisor
may now deviate from the default of not intervening, to intervening when the private information is
su¢ ciently negative. This e¤ect, however, turns out not to be relevant, as such an extreme distortion is




2 (Ccon; C?], and bs > 12 , the optimal test design may be conservative or
lenient, depending on parameter values and the speculator produces information following
a pass (fail) test when the policy is lenient (conservative).
(c) If c
n
> C?, then s = bs.
Proof see Appendix.
As before, we can dene by Vfpassg (s) the expected bank value if the speculator
produces information following m = pass only and by smaxpass < bs the stress test design
that maximizes expected bank value conditional on this behaviour. This turns out to
be a lenient stress test, just like before. For low enough c
n
the supervisor can alterna-
tively induce information production following either signal by distorting the stress test
towards conservatism. Although the bank value Vffail;passg (s) is maximized at s = bs,
the supervisor will have to set s > bs in order to induce information production following
the fail signal. As c
n
increases, a stronger distortion towards conservatism is required so
as to leave more trading prots following m = fail.
Eventually, as the required disortion increases, several possibilities emerge. When  is
relatively low, the supervisor quickly reaches a point where a severe distortion would be
necessary to induce information production followingm = fail. The supervisor may then
prefer to switch to a lenient policy s = smaxpass < bs and accept that information only be
produced following m = pass. This happens at a threshold which we denote by spasspass;fail.
When  is relatively large, fail (s) increases more strongly in s. There can therefore be
distortions s 2 (bs; 2bs), that only induce information production following m = fail, but
not following m = pass. Faced with the choice of being able to induce either I = ffailg
or I = fpassg but not both, the supervisor would prefer I = fpassg if and only if bs < 1
2
.
For bs < 1
2
, the optimal policy then resembles the one described in Proposition 2: the
supervisor switches to a lenient policy when c
n
exceeds a threshold Ccon. This is feasible for
any value of c
n
that would have allowed to induce I = ffailg because pass (0) > fail (2bs).
For bs > 1
2
the preferred option is I = ffailg at a distortion smaxfail > bs towards conser-
vatism.10, as the expected bank value Vffailg (s) reaches the maximum at s = smaxfail when
information production occurs following m = fail only. This option, however, is not nec-

















> fail (1) so that for increasing cn the supervisor switches






and then remains there until c
n
has in-
creased so much that I = ? and s = bs becomes optimal. For  in an intermediate
range, it is possible that the supervisor may switch back and forth between leniency









, where spassfail is the maximum distortion towards conservatism
that the supervisor prefers before implementing the optimal lenient distortion smaxpass. For
 high enough, pass (2bs  1) < fail (1), and the supervisor optimally distorts towards
conservatism s 2
bs;mins?fail; 1	 until cn is so high as to render the distortion too
costly and s = bs becomes optimal, foregoing market information (I = ?).
We summarize the comparative statics in Corollary 1 which follows directly by taking
the derivatives of the corresponding expressions given in the Appendix.
10The optimal distortion smaxfail is larger than bs because the supervisor benets from generating a fail
signal more often since market information is only produced for banks that fail the stress test.
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Given an increase in , the supervisor is more likely to ignore the public signal as
a source of information since she can more often observe s directly. This has several
implications. First, under a conservative stress test, the supervisor is more likely to
let the bank continue despite a negative signal, when  is higher. This increases the
speculators trading prots and therefore allows the supervisor to induce more easily
information production following the fail signal. Second, the direct cost of distorting the
stress test is lower, since the supervisor needs to rely less on the information it generates.
Hence, the negative impact of a further distortion gets weaker when  increases. Both
e¤ects work in the same direction to increase the thresholds for conservative distortions
and decrease those for lenient distortions.
In the extreme case where the supervisor is always privately informed ( = 1), we
get smaxpass = s and s
max
fail = s. That is, the supervisor would be willing to distort the
stress test to the point where it no longer contains any directly useful information. This
limiting case captures a situation where the supervisor always has private information
and making the publicly observable stress test uninformative, becomes (weakly) optimal
as this maximizes the speculators trading prots.
Our results imply that the bank supervisor should be more conservative when a banks
shares are fairly liquid ( c
n
small). If however bank shares are illiquid, a lenient policy helps
to encourage information production in the nancial market. Moreover, an increase in 
renders conservatism optimal for a larger parameter set. This is because for low values of
c
n
it is always optimal to use a conservative stress test and as  increases the rst switching
point where conservatism ceases to be optimal is reached at higher values of c
n
. Some
researchers have argued that national supervisors are better informed about their local
banks than a supra-national supervisor. To the extent that this is the case, one should
expect national supervisors to be more conservative than a supra national supervisor.11
This provides a counterveiling incentive for national supervisors than that highlighted by
Carletti et al. (2020) who argue that national supervisors are more inclined to engage
in forbearance than a supra-national supervisor and therefore would prefer to hide bad
news about local banks.
Although our analysis is normative in spirit, there are some empirical predictions
we wish to highlight. First, we would expect the information content of banks share
prices to di¤er depending on whether a bank passed or failed a stress test. Typically,
share prices will be more informative for banks that pass the test compared to those
who fail (assuming that the degree of leniency is uniform across banks). The opposite
may be true only when banks are ex ante likely to be subject to intervention (bs > 1
2
)
and the supervisor applies a strongly conservative test. The more conservative the test,
the smaller we would expect the discrepancy in the information content of stock prices
between banks that passed and banks that failed the test to be.
Moreover, we showed that whenever c
n
> 0, an undistorted stress test (s = bs) would
result in no information production for banks that failed the test. Suppose bs > 1
2
, so that
11However, supra national supervisors tend to deal with large banks, hence they will tend to have more
liquid shares, so the sample is not quite comparable.
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the supervisor would intervene in the bank in the absence of any further information.
This implies that a bank that failed the test would be shut-down with certainty. Suppose
instead that the supervisor applies a conservative stress test (s > bs) so as to induce the
production of market information for banks that failed the test. This implies that there is
a chance for well capitalized banks that failed the test to have this information reected
in their stock price and thereby prevent intervention. A more conservative stress test can
therefore, somewhat paradoxically, reduce the probability that a bank will be subject to
intervention.12
Let us now consider the e¤ect that an increase in ", i.e., a worsening risk shifting
problem, has. As explained in Section 3, an increase in " makes the benchmark stress
test more conservative, because allowing bad banks to continue would destroy more value.
Note that the impact of " on the various threshold values of s are fully captured via a
change in bs. In this sense, the risk shifting problem does not in itself a¤ect the distortions
away from the benchmark. However, " a¤ects expected trading prots:
Lemma 4 Expected trading prots pass (s) and fail (s) decrease in " when the stress
test is conservative (s > bs).
When " increases, risk shifting generates more value for equityholders. An increase in "




< 0). This reduces trading prots and the speculators incentives to acquire
private information. When the stress test is lenient the previous argument is no longer
su¢ cient, because pass (s) not only depends on E1 but also, positively, on E1l . This is
because the expected value of equity, conditional onm = pass, is now also a¤ected by the
supervisors private information, which will sometimes lead her to intervene in spite of a
pass test (when s 2 [s; bs]). Since the signal is informative, the supervisor is more likely
to intervene when the bank is poorly capitalized (! = l) pushing expected equity value
conditional on ! = l more strongly below E1l than expected equity value conditional on
! = h is pushed below E1h. This e¤ect ends up generating a counterveiling e¤ect of " on
trading prots.13
On the other hand, the benet Vl of identifying a poorly capitalized bank and
intervening in it, increases in ".14 The private value of information (to the speculator
and equity holders) can therefore drop below the social value of information. It is well
known that, in general, the private value of information can be larger or smaller than the
social value of information.15 Although our nding is in the same spirit, we identify a
novel reason for the discrepancy: The claims that are traded (equity) do not reect the
social value of the information, which is measured by the impact on total bank value, i.e.,
12There is of course a counterveiling e¤ect, namely that a more conservative test generates more fail
results and the corresponding banks are subject to intervention when market prices reect no information.
However, for values of s close enough to bs this e¤ect is dominated.
13In numerical simulations we found that pass (s < bs) is decreasing in " for most, but not all, para-
meter constellations.
14This is immediate from (15) and (17). Note that Vh is independent of ", since a well capitalized
bank never engages in risk shifting.
15For example, information may have a speculative value because it allows trading prots, but the
information may not help allocate resources more e¢ ciently, in which case the private value is above the
social value. However, the opposite may also happen, when speculators cannot make money (e.g., because
prices reveal their information), although their information would help improve resource allocation.
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debt plus equity. In the context of a risk shifting problem, the impact of information on
equity value may be small, although its e¤ect on total "rm" value may be large. This,
of course, raises the question whether it would be better to derive market information by
having another claim than equity be traded. We address this question in Section 6.2.
6 Extensions
6.1 Disclosure policy
We assume in our main analysis that the supervisor is committed to disclosing the stress
test results. We now relax this assumption and explore the possible outcomes when the
supervisor can choose whether to disclose stress test results. We assume that m is hard
information, i.e., the supervisor can choose whether or not to disclose the realization ofm,
but she cannot pretend that a realization m = fail was a pass, and vice versa. First, let
us consider the case where the supervisor can choose ex post whether to disclose the signal
m. Given that it is in the supervisors interest to encourage information production in
the stock market, she would naturally want to disclose a pass signal and (weakly) prefer
not to disclose a fail signal. Other players can then perfectly infer a fail signal from
the supervisors action not to disclose. Consequently, the choice of ex post disclosure
corresponds to always disclosing. The case analysed in the paper can therefore also be
thought of as arising from an inability by the supervisor to commit not to disclose her
information ex post.
Next, we consider what happens if the supervisor commits ex ante to either always
or to never disclosing. We analyzed in Section 5 the general case in which the supervisor
always discloses the test result, so we directly turn to the case of no disclosure. If the
supervisor never discloses the signal m, the threshold s only a¤ects direct learning by
the supervisor, and she optimally sets s = ŝ (see Lemma 2). Having no access to the
test result (m), the speculators strategy is no longer contingent on signal m. We denote
his expected trading prot in this case by ND(ŝ) and provide its characterization.
Lemma 5 If the supervisor never discloses the stress test result, and the speculator ac-








E1 + 2ŝ (1  ŝ)E1l

: (32)
If the cost of information production is low enough (ND(ŝ)  cn), the speculator
will produce and trade on information when the stress test result is not disclosed. In
that case the supervisor gains nothing from disclosing the stress test result. Note that
ND(ŝ) > pass (bs), because no disclosure increases the informational advantage of the
speculator vis-a-vis the market maker. The supervisor may therefore be worse o¤ from
disclosing the stress test result - at least for an undistorted stress test.
On the other hand, we know that pass (s) can be increased by distorting the test
towards leniency and this can generate pass (s) > ND(ŝ).16 There may therefore be
values of c
n
> ND(ŝ), such that no market information would be available under a no
16There is, however, no value s 2 [s; s] such that fail (s) > ND (bs).
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Figure 4: This Figure shows trading prots as functions of s. The solid line presents the
trading prot conditional on a pass message while the dashed line shows the unconditional
prot under the no-disclosure policy. We keep the same parameter values from the example
used in Figure 2 except for Ah, D and , which are set at Ah = 3, D = 8:7 and  = 0:2.
Note that the value of ŝ remains unchanged.
disclosure policy, but it would be following a su¢ ciently lenient pass test. Figure 4
illustrates that distorting the stress test towards leniency and disclosing its result may
generate enough trading prots so as to yield more market information.
Whether it is worth distorting (and disclosing) the stress test, or not distorting it and
foregoing market information corresponds to one of the cases analysed in Proposition 3
(notably the threshold s?pass). This allows in principle a characterization of when commit-
ting not to disclose might or might not be optimal. From (32) we can see that ND (bs)






). Thus, for banks that are more
likely to require an intervention, it becomes harder to induce the production of market
information without the disclosure of further information, making it more worthwhile to
commit to disclosing. This nding is akin to Bouvard et al. (2015) or Williams (2017),
although the underlying reasons are entirely di¤erent.
6.2 Debt trading
As shown above, the equity claim may become relatively insensitive to private information
when the risk shifting problem is severe. In the bad state of nature, the lower asset value
is somewhat compensated for from the perspective of equity holders, because the bank
expropriates creditors by taking more risk. In this extension we allow the speculator to
decide, after observing the stress test result m, to trade either a risky debt claim or an
equity claim. To keep things simple, we assume that the speculator can only trade in one
claim and thus has to decide whether to trade in debt or equity, based on the expected
trading prot conditional on signal m. This assumption can be justied on the basis of
position limits that might be imposed on the speculator, for example, because of nancial
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constraints. We assume that a liquidity trader is present in the debt market and buys or
sells quantities nD with equal probability. The liquidity traders demand is independent
across the two markets.
We rst determine the banks debt valuation, depending on the state of the world ! as
well as the supervisors action. Following the notations previously used for equity value,
we denote byDa! the banks debt value that corresponds to ! and the supervisors decision
a. If the supervisor intervenes, the debtholder collects a value A! + 
p
2










R + (1  p) r

and thus
D0 = D0h  D0l = Ah










D + (1  p  ") r: (34)




D1 = D1h  D1l






We observe immediately that debt value is always higher in the high state of the world,
whether or not the intervention takes place, D0 > 0 and D1 > 0.17 The debtholder
collects a higher value Ah from the asset in place if the supervisor intervenes in the high
state of the world. The speculator can thus prot from trading on his private information
about the state ! even if the bank supervisor intervenes. If the supervisor allows the bank
to continue, the debtholder benets in the high state not only from a higher asset value
but also from the bankers prudent behavior (no risk-shifting). We show the speculators
expected prot from trading in debt in the general case ( > 0):
Lemma 6 The speculators trading strategy is described in Proposition 1. Expected trad-


























+ [1  s2    (1  ŝ2)]D0

if s < 2bs  1
(35)
17Note that D0l > D
1
l , i.e., creditors prefer the bank to be liquidated in the bad state, rather than be
continued.
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Figure 5: This Figure shows the speculators prots from trading the debt claim following a
message m = pass (downward sloped line) and a message m = fail (non-continuous dashed








D1 (2  s) (s2   ŝ2) + (2  s) ŝ2D0
 2ŝ (s   ŝ) (D0l  D1l )








  (D1  D0) (2  s) (s + ŝ)
 2ŝ (D0l  D1l )

+s (2  s)D0
9=; if bs  s  2bs

4
s (2  s)D0 if s < bs
:
(36)
Note that, similarly to equity trading in Section 5, D;fail is continuous in s, except at
the point s = 2bs where the supervisor changes her intervention policy to always allowing
the bank to continue following a fail signal except when she privately observes s 2 [0; bs].
When D1 is higher than D0, implying that trade in debt is more protable if the
bank is allowed to continue, D;fail jumps upwards in the point s = 2bs. Otherwise, as
shown in Figure 5, D;fail jumps downwards.
Under the assumption nD = n,18 a direct comparison of Lemma 6 to the speculators
prot from trading shares presented in Lemma 3, allows us to determine which security
the speculator prefers to trade in.
When the stress test is lenient (s < bs), the speculator would always prefer to trade
debt following a failed test. This is because a fail signal under a lenient stress test
conveys such negative information that the banks equity is wiped out with certainty and
it is therefore impossible to make a prot from trading in equity. Following a pass signal,
the speculator may prefer to trade a debt or an equity claim, depending on parameter
values. When the risk shifting problem becomes more severe (" increases), the value of the
18In practice, debt markets tend to be signicantly less liquid than stock markets. The assumption
nD = n is therefore not made for realism, but rather to provide analytical focus on the factors a¤ecting
the choice of the traded security. Obviously, liquidity is itself one such factor.
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Figure 6: This Figure shows the speculators prots from trading either the debt claim following
a pass signal (grey solid line) and a fail signal (grey dot-dashed line), or the equity following
pass (black solid line) and fail (black dashed line). For a better presentation, we have modied
parameter values to :  = 0:9, r = 7:5, R = 8:2, D = 7:9, Ah = 2:8, p = 0:57, s = 0:34.
The value of ŝ varies from 0:174 to 0:338 for " 2 [0:20; 0:25] so that s is always between ŝ
and 2ŝ.
equity claim becomes less sensitive to the underlying state of the world. At relatively low
levels of " the speculator may therefore prefer to trade in equity, following a pass signal,
but switch to trading the debt claim when " increases. That is, we have E1 > D1








r  D + R
2
: (37)
We illustrate this e¤ect by providing a numerical example in Figure 6. We discuss the
details in the proof of Corollary 2. More generally, an increase in " tends to make trading
in a debt claim relatively more protable, regardless of whether such a trade follows a
pass or fail signal and regardless of whether the stress test is lenient or conservative.
This is formally stated in the following Corollary:
Corollary 2 The di¤erence in trading prots from trading a debt instead of an equity
claim is (weakly) increasing in ", both following a pass and following a fail signal.
Relating to Proposition 3, we see that allowing trade in a risky debt claim can encour-
age more information production by the speculator, particularly when the risk-shifting
problem is relatively severe (high "). As implied by Lemma 4, a high " dampens the
speculators incentive to trade shares (for bs  s  2bs), and consequently the supervisor
is less likely to choose a conservative policy. The possibility of trading debt helps to relax
the speculators participation constraint and reduces the extent of policy distortion. In
other words, the policy s can be set closer to the benchmark bs and hence the quality
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of the stress test is improved. This ultimately improves the supervisors intervention
decision.
Our ndings are thus broadly in line with existing proposals to introduce sub-ordinated
debt in a banks capital structure as a means to make market information about risk tak-
ing available to bank supervisors (see, for example, Flannery and Bliss, 2019). A full
analysis of this question would, however, require a richer set-up. In this simple extension,
allowing risky debt to be traded is like a free option, that is, risky debt would at worst
be useless. As such it is not surprising that it may sometimes help. More interesting is
the observation that it will help for the banks that failed a stress test, but it may not
help for those banks that passed it. Of course, this ignores many relevant complications:
We assumed that liquidity of debt is just the same as of equity and the introduction of
one security does not a¤ect the liquidity of the other. Both of these assumptions are
questionable. Relatedly, if a trader can acquire information and then decide in which
instruments to trade (possibly in both), this will obviously a¤ect information revelation.
Fully taking these issues on board is beyond the scope of this paper.
7 Conclusion
This paper develops a theory of how a bank supervisors degree of leniency in designing
stress tests for banks a¤ects information produced via nancial markets. We show that the
supervisor may optimally lower the hurdle for banks to pass the test in order to encourage
information production in the stock market. Our model shows that such lenient tests
should be applied to banks whose shares are less liquid, or where information production
is particularly costly for speculators. Moreover, a supervisor may nd it optimal to use a
conservative test design when she is more likely to be privately informed. We also point
out that the stock market may become a less suitable conduit for information when the
risk-shifting problem worsens.
While our model is framed in a setting where bank supervisors learn about the bank
types from prices and decide whether to intervene, we believe many of the papers insights
apply more broadly. For example, a credit rating agency can be more or less lenient in
its ratings, which, together with information learned from stock prices, will a¤ect the
availability and quality of credit. Again, we would expect an interaction between the
credit rating agencys degree of leniency and the usefulness of stock markets in producing
additional information about a rms prospects.
8 Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1 : We rst show that it is optimal for the speculators to submit
an order with a xed size n. The market maker observes anonymous orders and we denote
the actual order as a pair,
X = (xn; xs)
in which xn is the size of the order submitted by the liquidity trader and xs the size of the
order by the speculator. The order observed by the market maker X 0 can be thought of
as a random reshu­ ing so that X 0 = (xn; xs) or X 0 = (xs; xn) with equal probability. Let
the market makers out of equilibrium belief be that any buy (sell) order that is not of
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size n ( n) is due to a positively (negatively) informed speculator. If the speculator were
to submit an order of any size other than n, he would immediately reveal his identity
and thus his private information to the market trader. Therefore, the speculator cannot
make any trading prot unless he trades in the same size as the liquidity trader, in which
case the speculator may hide his private information if X = ( n;+n) or X = (+n; n).
When X = ( n; n), the market knows that speculator submitted a sell order and sets
a corresponding low price, reecting ! = l. Similarly, the market maker will set a high
price upon observing X = (+n;+n). When the speculator has no information he would
lose on average if he trades based on an uninformative signal.
We next prove the speculators trading direction and prot conditional on the signal
m = pass. First, when s is chosen at any level above 2bs  1, the supervisor will let the
bank continue following good news (m = pass) unless the share price reveals ! = l. The
banks equity value is thus E1h if ! = h and E
1
l otherwise. Anticipating that, the market
maker sets the following price P n;npass upon receiving an uninformative order ow, as the
weighted average of E1h and E
1
l :








We can then compute, for the case with s  2bs   1, the speculators per unit trading
prot conditional on m = pass, after observing the signal z 2 fl; hg and trading in
direction q! 2 f 1; 0; 1g :
pass (s
  2bs  1) = 
2

















l it is optimal to buy after ! = h (qh = 1) and sell after ! = l










If s < 2bs  1, the supervisor intervenes following both m = pass and m = fail if the
share price reveals no additional information, in which case the equity value of the bank
is zero. The speculator would thus have no incentive to acquire information and trade,
i.e., pass (s < 2bs  1) = 0.
Consider now the speculators trading prot conditional on signal m = fail. When s
is chosen at any level above 2bs, the supervisor would allow the bank to continue following
m = fail unless the share price reveals ! = l. The market maker thus sets the following
price P n;nfail after receiving an uninformative order ow,












The speculators per unit trading prot conditional onm = fail for the case when s > 2bs
is
fail (s
 > 2bs) = 
2




















 > 2bs) = 
4
E1s (2  s) :
Similarly, for the case with s  2bs, the supervisor always intervenes following m = fail
if the share price does not reveal other information, in which case fail (s  2bs) = 0.
QED.
Proof of Proposition 2 : See proof of Proposition 3.
Proof of Lemma 3 : We rst check the speculators trading prots conditional on
m = pass. Note that he makes prots only when his private information is hidden in the
order ow received by the market maker. If s is chosen above ŝ, the supervisor allows the
bank to continue when learning m = pass regardless of whether she is privately informed
(any private information in this range would only conrm the optimality of continuation).






, as in the corresponding case of
Proposition 1. If s is chosen between 2bs   1 and bs, the supervisor would also continue
following m = pass, except when she learns privately s 2 (s; ŝ). Anticipating the
supervisors strategy, the market maker sets the trading price as:
P n;npass = Pr (ŝ  s < 1 \ ! = hjs  s)E1h + Pr (ŝ  s < 1 \ ! = ljs  s)E1l
+Pr (s  s < ŝ \ ! = hjs  s)

E0h + (1  )E1h

+Pr (s  s < ŝ \ ! = ljs  s)

















+(1  ) 2 (ŝ  s
)  (ŝ2   s2)
2 (1  s) E
1
l :
We then compute the speculators expectation of the banks equity value given its private
signal z, z = !, and uninformative order ows
E[Ea!jpass; !] = Pr (ŝ  s < 1js  s \ !)E1!
+Pr (s  s < ŝjs  s \ !)
















E1l + (1  )




The speculator buys when receiving z = h and sells when z = l, by comparing the market
makers price in (43) to the speculators conditional expectation of the banks equity value
as in, respectively (44) and (45). This then allows us to calculate the per unit trading
prot following m = pass.
pass (s
 2 [s; s]) = 
2








Pr (! = ljm = pass)
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Finally if s is chosen below 2bs   1, the supervisor will always intervene following a
pass message unless she observes privately s > bs. We derive the market makers price
when learning m = pass as well as the speculators expectation of the banks equity value
based on both m and z:
P n;npass = Pr (ŝ  s < 1 \ ! = hjs  s)

E1h + (1  )E0h

+Pr (ŝ  s < 1 \ ! = ljs  s)

E1l + (1  )E0l

+Pr (s  s < ŝ \ ! = hjs  s)E0h
+Pr (s  s < ŝ \ ! = ljs  s)E0l ;



















We can then compute the trading prot following a pass message for the case of
choosing s < 2bs  1,
pass (s













which can be simplied to
pass (s










We now check the speculators trading prots conditional on m = fail. If s < ŝ,
the supervisor will intervene upon its own information. Trading thus generates the same
prot fail as in (26) (for s < 2bs). If bs  s  2bs, the supervisor always intervene
except when she is informed of the value of s and s 2 [ŝ; s]. As in the previous case, we
compute the market makers price,
P n;nfail = Pr (s < ŝ \ ! = ljs < s)E0h + Pr (s < ŝ \ ! = hjs < s)E0l
+Pr (bs  s < s \ ! = hjs < s) E1h + (1  )E0h
+Pr (ŝ  s < s \ ! = ljs < s)

E1l + (1  )E0l


















2(s   ŝ)  (s2   ŝ2)
2s   s2 E
1
l : (53)
By comparing the market makers price in (51) to the speculators conditional expectation
of the banks equity value as in (52) and (53) respectively, we know that the speculator
buys if his private signal z = h and sells otherwise. We then compute the speculators













E1 (2  s) (s + ŝ) + 2ŝE1l

which increases in s 2 [bs; 2bs].
Finally, we compute the trading prot following m = fail when s is chosen above 2bs.
In this case, the supervisor would never intervene upon learning m = fail except when
it observes s < bs. Using the same algorithm, we compute below the market makers
price and then compare it to the speculators expectation of the banks equity value
conditioning on his own signal z,
P n;nfail =

Pr (s < ŝ \ ! = ljs < s)E1l + Pr (s < ŝ \ ! = hjs < s)E1h

(1  ) (54)
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2   ŝ2




which increases in s and peaks when s = 1. QED
Proof of Proposition 3: Preliminaries: We state the value functions VI (s) valid
on the interval s 2 [s; s] ; i.e., when s is su¢ ciently informative for the supervisor to


















  (s)2Vh   (1  s)2Vl +  (bs  s)2 (Vh +Vl)	 ;
which reaches its maximum at s = bs. Concerning Vpass (s) we need to distinguish the
case s  bs from s < bs.
Vfpassg (s
  bs) = 1
2






























which is maximized at s = bs. Moreover,
Vfpassg (s



































(1  s)2   (1  bs)2Vl   bs2   (s)2Vh	 :
Using bs = Vl
Vh+Vl
we can nd the value of s that maximizes Vfpassg (s) : Dening



















Since Vfpassg (s) is continuous in s = bs, Vfpassg (s) reaches its maximum on the interval
[s; s] at smaxpass. Note that (27) and (28) are special cases of (58) and (59), respectively.
Expected bank value when the speculator only acquires information following a fail
test is given by
Vffailg (s
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 ; 2bs) > bs: (60)
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2bs  bs2V 0l (62)
reaches its maximum at s = bs. An analogous expression obtains for V? (s  bs) which
also reaches its maximum at s = bs. Hence, the optimal policy is s = bs, and the value
V? (s
 = bs) is independent of  and given by
V? (bs) = 1
2
 
1  bs2V 1h + bs2V 0h + (1  bs)2 V 1l +  2bs  bs2V 0l 	 :








: From these we note the
following properties. If bs < 1
2
then Vfpassg (s = 0) > Vffailg (s = 2bs) and V maxpass > V maxfail .
If bs > 1
2
then Vfpassg (s = 2bs  1) < Vffailg (s = 1) and V maxpass < V maxfail . Obviously, we
also have Vfpass;failg (bs)  V maxpass  V? (bs) and Vfpass;failg (bs)  V maxfail  V? (bs) with strict
inequalities when  > 0.
Moreover, denote by sI
0
I the maximum distortion that the supervisor is willing to
incur so as to ensure that information is produced following messages m 2 I instead
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= V maxpass :
















  (1  bs) 
2
> bs:(66)














= V maxfail is irrelevant (the supervisor would not choose s







and for such values of c
n
, it is never possible to induce I = ffailg at
smaxfail ). Note also that the point s
fail




= V maxfail is also
irrelevant since the required distortion to induce either I = fpass; failg or I = ffailg
go in the same direction (conservatism) and I = fpass; failg obviously dominates I =
ffailg (hence any switch from I = fpass; failg to I = ffailg would occur because
I = fpass; failg has become infeasible, but not because it is dominated by I = ffailg).
Note that we have s?pass  smaxpass < bs < smaxfail < spassfail  s?fail: Moreover, (29) is a special
case of (64) for  = 0.
We start by showing that it is never optimal to set s > 2bs (relevant when bs < 1
2
)
or s < 2bs   1 (relevant when bs > 1
2
). Consider rst bs < 1
2
and s > 2bs. Since a fail
test is per se no longer su¢ ciently informative to induce intervention, expected bank
value for a given set I drops in s around s = 2bs. The only potential advantage of
setting s > 2bs would be to improve the information production by the speculator, i.e.,
change the set I. pass (s) is decreasing in s so an increase of s will only tighten the
constraint on information production following m = pass. fail (s) is increasing in s,
so the only advantage of setting s > 2bs would be to induce information production
following m = fail. Comparing the set I induced when s 2 [s; s] and the set I 0 induced
by setting s > 2bs, several congurations are possible. (a) I = fpassg ; I 0 = fpass; failg,
(b) I = fpassg ; I 0 = ffailg, (c) I = ?; I 0 = ffailg. In case (a) the banks expected
19The solutions (63) - (66) can generate numbers outside the admissible interval for s, in which case
it is understood that the supervisor is never indi¤erent between the corresponding two options.
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value at I 0 = fpass; failg is:
Vffail;passg (s








































which is independent of s. It can shown that V maxpass > Vffail;passg (s
 > 2bs) and hence it
is better to set s = smaxpass. Since pass (s
) is a decreasing function, it follows that under
conguration (a) when I 0 = fpass; failg is feasible for s > 2bs, I = fpassg is feasible
for any s < 2bs, so that V maxpass can actually be attained. For cases (b) and (c), note that
pass (s
 = 0) = fail (s
 = 1) and therefore whenever I 0 = ffailg is feasible by setting
s > 2bs it is also feasible to induce I = fpassg by setting s low enough and inducing
the value Vfpassg (s). Moreover, we can calculate expected bank value when I 0 = ffailg
and s > 2bs (and hence the fail test is ignored by the supervisor who allows the bank to
continue in the absence of further information):
Vffailg (s
 > 2bs) = 1
2
n 






































which is maximized at s = 1. Note that Vffailg (s = 1) = Vfpassg (s = 0) and since
V maxpass > Vfpassg (s
 = 0) and Vfpassg (s = 0) is increasing in the point s = 0 there are
points 0 < s < bs that are strictly preferred to s = 1 and that are also feasible. It
follows that cases (b) and (c) are strictly dominated, except in the limit case  = 1, when
the supervisor is indi¤erent between setting s = 0 or s = 1.
Consider next bs > 1
2
and s < 2bs  1. Similar to the previous case, the only potential
benet of choosing s < 2bs   1 is to induce I 0 = fpassg (It is impossible to induce
I 0 = fpass; failg at s < 2bs   1 since fail (s < bs) = 0). Using the expected trading
prots given in (30), we can show that, for
 >  
4bsE1
4bsE1 + E1l (2bs  1) ; (68)
pass (s
) is maximized at s = 0, and for   ; pass (s) is maximized at s = 2bs 1. If
  , then setting s < 2bs 1 does not help in inducing information production, so there
is clearly no benet in doing so. If  > , then setting s < 2bs  1 can potentially help
inducing information production following the pass signal. Like above, setting s = 0
is optimal on the interval [0; 2bs   1). Since we have again pass (s = 0) = fail (s = 1)
and at bs > 1
2
we have V maxfail > Vffailg (s
 = 1) = Vfpassg (s
 = 0) it follows that inducing
information production is weakly more valuable by distorting s towards 1, as m = fail
is still informative in this case, rather than setting s = 0.
Proof of part (a): Since fail (bs) = 0, I = fpass; failg is not feasible at s = bs for
any c
n




it is therefore possible to induce I = fpass; failg by setting s > bs where s
given by fail (s) = cn . By continuity of the value functions, there exist small enough
values of c
n
(and hence s close enough to bs), such that Vfpass;failg (s) > Vfpassg  smaxpass :
As c
n




a point that we denote by Ccon, where it becomes either (i) impossible to induce I =
fpass; failg or (ii) undesirable. (i) happens when s is so high such that information
production cannot be induced following either test result. Since pass is increasing and
fail decreasing in s; denote by s= the highest value of s such that fail (s)  pass (s)
(since fail is discontinuous in 2bs the two functions may not intersect). Ccon is then given
by Ccon = fail (s=). (ii) happens when the required distortion sgiven by the solution
to fail (s) = cn is so strong as to imply that Vfpass;failg (s
) < V maxpass . (Note that at
any s that is set so as to induce information production following fail, we never have
Vfpass;failg (s
) < Vffailg (s





For  = 0, fail (s 2 [s; s]) = 0 and hence I = fpass; failg is never feasible, nor is
I = ffailg. We therefore get Ccon = 0 and are in region (b) for any cn > 0.
Proof of part (b1): We know that for bs < 1
2
, Vfpassg (s = 0) > Vffailg (s = 2bs) and
V maxpass > V
max
fail . Using (60) it can be shown that for  below a cut-o¤, s
max
fail lies at the interior
of its admissible interval, i.e., smaxfail 2 (bs; 2bs). For bs < 12 we always have smaxpass 2 [0; bs).








when both smaxpass and
smaxfail are interior solutions. Hence, if it is feasible to induce I = ffailg at smaxfail 2 (bs; 2bs)
it is also feasible to induce I = fpassg at smaxpass, which the supervisor prefers. For  above
the cut-o¤, we get smaxfail = 2bs. It can be shown that for bs < 12 , pass  smaxpass > fail (2bs)
and since Vfpassg (s = 0) > Vffailg (s = 2bs) ; where Vfpassg (s = 0) is the lower bound of
what can be implemented if the supervisor switches to I = fpassg, the supervisor prefers
I = fpassg for any necessary distortion s < smaxpass.
As c
n
increases, eventually, I = fpassg becomes either infeasible (when c
n
> pass (0))
or undesirable (when the required distortion s is so strong as to imply V? (bs) > Vfpassg (s)).
Whichever point is reached rst pins down the cut-o¤ C?.
Proof of part (b2): We know that for bs > 1
2
, Vfpassg (s = 2bs  1) < Vffailg (s = 1) and
V maxpass < V
max
fail . Regarding which I is feasible, it is useful to distinguish the following two
cases. As pass (0) = fail (1) the threshold  dened in (68) is also the threshold such
that (i) for   , , pass (2bs  1)  fail (1) and (ii) for  > , pass (2bs  1) < fail (1).









< fail (1) (there is again a cut-o¤in  such that for su¢ ciently
small values of  case (ia) occurs. For brevity we do not provide the exact value of this
threshold here).














where 2 > 1 such that: for  < 1, smaxpass > 2bs   1 and spassfail < 1, for  2 [1; 2] ;
smaxpass > 2bs   1 and spassfail = 1 and nally for  > 2, smaxpass = 2bs   1 and spassfail = 1. Note
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that, depending on the values of  and bs, 1 can take any value between zero and one
and 1 can be smaller or larger than .





















where it is infeasible to induce I = ffailg
even though it is the preferred option. When  = 0, fail (s) = 0 and the supervisor sets
s  bs for any c
n
> 0. In this case, the supervisor optimally induces I = ffailg by setting









. At that point the







there are several possibilities.




 fail (1) (case (ia)) then feasibility requires that







beyond which the supervisor sets
s = bs and accepts I = ?. If  is high enough so that pass  smaxpass < fail (1) (case (ib)),



















When   1 the supervior prefers to stick to I = ffailg for all necessary distortions
up to s = 1 rather than to induce I = fpassg by setting s = smaxpass. In case (ii) this
is feasible and so s is determined by c
n
= fail (s
) until C? = fail (1). In case (i) the
supervisor also distorts to the point s = 1, but for c
n
> fail (1) may switch to s = smaxpass
until the required distortion is s = s?pass, which pins down C?. QED
Proof of Lemma 4 : We use pass (s) dened in (30) to compute the partial
derivative of pass (s) with respect to " for the case in which the policy is conserva-


















< 0, pass (s) decreases in ".
Similarly, using the trading prot fail (s) dened in Lemma 3, we compute the






































 (s   ŝ) R D
2


























Proof of Lemma 5 Knowing that the test result (m) is now private, the speculators
strategy is no longer contingent onm. Given s = ŝ, the expected equity value conditional
on ! is,
E[Ea!j!] = Pr (ŝ  s  1j!)E1! + Pr (0  s < ŝj!)E0!
38
and the market makers price is
P n;n = Pr (ŝ  s < 1 \ ! = h)E1h + Pr (ŝ  s < 1 \ ! = l)E1l
+Pr (s < ŝ \ ! = h)E0h + Pr (s < ŝ \ ! = l)E0l :
which can be simplied to
P n;n = Pr (! = h)E[Ea!j! = h] + Pr (! = l)E[Ea!j! = l]






















E1 + 2ŝ (1  ŝ)E1l

QED
Proof of Lemma 6 : We rst calculate the speculators trading prots conditional
on m = pass. If s is set above ŝ, the supervisor chooses to allow the bank to continue
when learning m = pass regardless of whether they are privately informed. The banks
debt value is thus D1h if ! = h and D
1
l otherwise. Anticipating that, the market maker
sets the following price P n;npass upon receiving an uninformative order ow:








We can then compute the speculators per unit trading prot conditional on m = pass
























If however s is chosen between 2bs   1 and bs, the supervisor would not intervene
except when it learns privately s 2 [s; ŝ). Anticipating the supervisors strategy, the
market maker sets the trading price as below,
P n;npass = Pr (ŝ  s  1 \ ! = hjs  s)D1h + Pr (ŝ  s  1 \ ! = ljs  s)D1l (72)
+Pr (s  s  ŝ \ ! = hjs  s)

D0h + (1  )D1h

+Pr (s  s  ŝ \ ! = ljs  s)

D0l + (1  )D1l

We then compute the speculators expectation of the banks debt value given its private
signal z, z = !, and uninformative order ows
E[Da!jpass; !] = Pr (ŝ  s  1js  s \ !)D1!
+Pr (s  s < ŝjs  s \ !)




















2 (ŝ  s)  (ŝ2   s2)
(1  s)2

D0l + (1  )D1l

(74)
Comparing the market makers price given by (72) to the speculators conditional ex-
pectation of the banks debt value as in respectively (73) and (74), we infer that buying
(selling) when ! = h (! = l) is optimal. This then allows us to calculate the per unit











Pr (! = ljm = pass)
 


































which decreases in s.
Finally if however s is chosen below 2bs   1, the supervisor would always intervene
except when she learns privately s 2 [ŝ; 1] . Anticipating the supervisors strategy, the
market maker sets the trading price as below,
P n;npass = Pr (ŝ  s  1 \ ! = hjs  s)

D1h + (1  )D0h

(75)
+Pr (ŝ  s  1 \ ! = ljs  s)

D1l + (1  )D0l

+Pr (s  s < ŝ \ ! = hjs  s)D0h + Pr (s  s < ŝ \ ! = ljs  s)D0l :
The speculators expectation of the banks debt value is, given his private signal z, z = !,
and uninformative order ow
E[Da!jpass; !] = Pr (ŝ  s  1js  s \ !)

D1! + (1  )D0!


















D1l + (1  )D0l

+
2 (ŝ  s)  (ŝ2   s2)
(1  s)2
D0l (77)
































In the second part of this proof, we compute the speculators prots in trading debt
following a signal m = fail. If s < ŝ, the supervisor will always intervene, regardless
whether they are privately informed. The banks debt value is thus D0h if ! = h and
D0l otherwise. Anticipating that, the market maker sets the following price P
 n;n
fail upon
receiving an uninformative order ow:








We can then compute the speculators per unit trading prot conditional on m = fail





















If bs  s  2bs, the supervisor always intervenes except when she is informed of
the value of s and s 2 [ŝ; s]. As in the previous case, we compute the price and the
speculators conditional expectation of the banks debt value,
P n;nfail = Pr (s < ŝ \ ! = ljs < s)D0h + Pr (s < ŝ \ ! = hjs < s)D0l
+Pr (bs  s < s \ ! = hjs < s) D1h + (1  )D0h
+Pr (ŝ  s < s \ ! = ljs < s)



















2(s   ŝ)  (s2   ŝ2)
2s   s2

D1l + (1  )D0l

(80)
We then compute the speculators expected per unit prot from trading debt when m =
























Finally we compute the trading prot following m = fail when s > 2bs. In this case,
the supervisor would never intervene upon learning m = fail except when it observes
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s < bs. This yields
P n;nfail = Pr (s < ŝ \ ! = ljs < s)

D0l + (1  )D1l

+Pr (s < ŝ \ ! = hjs < s)

D0h + (1  )D1h














2(s   ŝ)  (s2   ŝ2)






D0l + (1  )D1l

: (83)





























(1  bs) ŝ  D0  D1+ ŝ  D1l  D0l + 4bs (1  bs)D1
(84)
Comparing (81) to (84), we obtain the magnitude of the jump at the point s = 2ŝ shown
in Figure 5, which is





Hence, D;fail jumps upwards at s = 2ŝ i¤D1 > D0. QED
Proof of Corollary 2 : In this proof we skip the case of having s < 2bs   1 in
which the monitoring policy can never be optimal. When s is chosen below bs, we know
already that trading in equity following a fail signal cannot be protable, in which case
the speculator will always choose to trade debt claims (whenever feasible) and his prot
is independent of " based on Lemma 6. In the situation where s is set between bs and
2bs and the bank passes the stress test, we know from Lemma 3 and Lemma 6 that the
magnitude of D;pass (s) pass (s) depends completely on D1 E1, which increases
in ". The intuition is discussed in the main text.
We next check two other cases. The rst one is when the bank fails the stress test
given that s is set between bs and 2bs, and the second is when the bank passes the test for
s chosen below bs . The other possibilities are discussed in the main text. For the rst
case, we need to compute the di¤erence between D;fail (s) in Lemma 6 and fail (s) in
Lemma 3. The di¤erence is
D;fail (s








(s2   ŝ2) + D0ŝ2 + 2 (D
1






D0 (1  ) s2
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D1h   E1h  D0h








where the rst term is obviously positive as 2r+R 2D
2
> 0 and s > ŝ. We can show that




D1h   E1h  D0h = (2  p) (D   Ah)  (1 + )
hp
2
R + (1  p) r
i








 (R D) (s   ŝ) (2  s   ŝ) +
[(2  p) (D   Ah   r) + p (r  R)]
2 (s   2ŝ)
s







which is positive. Hence, the speculator may nd it more protable to trade debt when
the risk-shifting problem is su¢ ciently severe (high ").
Next, we check the case in which s is chosen below bs. Upon a signal pass, the
speculator compares D;pass if he trades debt with a prot pass if he trades equity. Using
the results from Lemma 3 and 6, we can compute the di¤erence in trading prots,












 (ŝ  s) (s + ŝ)
 










 D1l + E1l +D0l

As in the previous case, the rst term (D1  E1) (1  s2) increases in " and becomes
positive when " is above the threshold given in (37). In the second term, we have

















which also increases in " as we know 2r  D > 0 from assumption (9) and (13). Finally,
( D1l + E1l +D0l ) in the third term increases in ", and  







1 s which is positive. Hence, the speculator should prefer to trade in debt if " is
su¢ ciently high. QED
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9 APPENDIX B
In this Appendix we show how the supervisors intervention can be interpreted as a bail-
out, whereby a capital shortfall is made up by an equity issue plus government money.
Let us also suppose that the government nds it costly to have the bank default on its
creditors ex post, maybe because such a bank failure exerts negative externalities on the
rest of the banking system. This will provide an additional motive for the supervisor to
inject government money into a poorly capitalized bank.
The banks incentive to behave prudently when its balance sheet is impaired can be
restored by injecting fresh equity capital Ah. The value of the banks equity, after a bank
has raised capital Ah in state ! = l is
p
2
(R + Ah  D) + (1  p) (r + Ah  D) :
Given our prior parametric assumptions, even if the new equity holders are given 100%




(R + Ah  D) + (1  p) (r + Ah  D) < Ah:
Recapitalizing the bank therefore requires (i) wiping out the old equity holders entirely,
and (ii) an injection of government funds of magnitude
b  Ah  
p
2




(2r + Ah  R D) +D   r > 0:
Note that in this specication, there is a cost to the supervisor of bailing out the bank.
One could imagine that some of the cost is recovered because the supervisor holds claims
against the banks future cash ows. Suppose for simplicity, that the bail-out money is a
pure subsidy.
Suppose that a bank default exerts an externality of magnitude k. The supervisor
maximizes the expected value of the bank minus the expected cost of a bank failure and
minus the subsidy. Note that the new money raised by fresh equity washes out of the
planners objective function since this money was in the economy regardless. As before, a
well capitalized bank will not engage in risk shifting and will only default if its cash ow is
0.20 Hence, the supervisors payo¤ from allowing a bank to continue without intervention
















i.e., the supervisor loses from providing a subsidy to a well capitalized bank and V 1h > V
0
h .
20Assume that 2Ah < D so that even a good bank that was recapitalized erroneously will default in
this case.
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R + (1  p  ")r  









R + (1  p)r   p
2
k   b:
Hence, it is benecial to recapitalize in the low state if V 0l > V
1
l , i.e., when
p
2
R + (1  p)r > b 







R + (1  p  ")r:
In other words, the benet from a recapitalization is now two-fold. First, it increases bank
value because a recapitalized bank refrains from risk shifting, and second, it reduces the
failure externality. The cost of recapitalizing comes in the form of the social cost of the
subsidy to the bank. One can now redo the previous analysis with the new expressions
for V a! .
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